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2I. Introduction
The main observation investigated in this paper is the dramatic increase in the proportion of two-
earner households,1 from 33% to 76%, during the period 1959-1999 (Figure 1).2 This change was due
mainly to a large number of married females joining the workforce. In fact, married females’ labor
force participation (LFP) increased by approximately 130%, while married males’ participation remained
roughly constant. Figure 2 reveals that the average number of annual hours worked, conditional on
working a positive number of hours, has remained roughly constant for males and only slightly increased
for females. Hence, the overall trend in the labor supply of married couples was driven by the rise in the
labor supply of married women, which transpired primarily at the extensive (participation) rather than
the intensive (hours conditional on participation) margin.
Goldin (1990) and Costa (2000) provide a comprehensive documentation of historical trends in female
labor supply and proposed explanations. Most commonly cited among the economic explanations of the
rise in female labor supply are the home production revolution and factors that tend to close the gender
wage gap. The former refers to the widespread diﬀusion of electrical appliances, such as washing machines,
dishwashers and vacuum cleaners, often assumed to be a result of falling prices of home appliances. Jones
et al. (2003) find that a small reduction in the gender wage diﬀerential, modeled as a discrimination tax
on female income, can account for the entire observed increase in the labor supply of married females
during the period 1950-2000, while the decline in prices of home appliances is much less quantitatively
important. By contrast, Greenwood et al. (2005) focus on the period 1900-1990, finding the decline in
the relative price level of home appliances to be the main driving force underlying the rise in female LFP.
One objective of this paper is to extend the test of these competing explanations to several important
empirical observations documented in this paper, in particular, changes in participation for disaggre-
gated groups of married women and gender-specific trends in leisure, i.e., time not spent on market or
home production. Moreover, instead of focusing on the gender earnings gap as the only aspect of the
joint earnings distribution of husbands and wives, we break down the earnings distribution into several
components3 (gender earnings gap, gender-specific inequality and assortativeness of matching) and in-
vestigate each in isolation. The idea that within-gender inequality may be an important determinant
1We regard a person as a labor force participant (interchangeably used with "an earner" and "a worker") if he/she works
a positive number of hours in a given year. We emphasize that the use of the term "labor force participation" is not in line
with the standard use of this term in macroeconomics.
2All datawork is original. We use the U.S. population census data available through IPUMS (2004). Although censuses
were conducted in 1960, 1970, ..., 2000, the income and worktime questions therein referred to the previous year. Hence, the
observations used in this paper are for 1959, 1969, ..., 1999. Only nonfarm married couples with each spouse between the
ages of 25 and 64 are considered. (See the appendix for further discussion.) We focus on this particular time period because
the U.S. census provides income information for both spouses (and not just the main respondent) only beginning with the
1960 census.
3More precisely, the mean vector and covariance matrix of any bivariate distribution,m =

m1
m2

and S =

s21 s12
s12 s22

,
can be uniquely represented asm =

m1
m1GG

and S =

(m1CV1)
2 ρ (m1CV1) ((m1GG)CV2)
ρ (m1CV1) ((m1GG)CV2) ((m1GG)CV2)
2

, where
GG = m2/m1 represents the gender gap (a measure of inequality between genders), CV1 ≡ s1/m1 and CV2 ≡ s2/m2 are
coeﬃcients of variation (a measure of inequality within gender i) and ρ = s12/ (s1s2) is the correlation coeﬃcient (a reflection
of the degree of assortativeness of matching). We should point out that the value of the correlation of spouses’ potential
earnings could reflect factors other than the assortativeness of matching (e.g., a network of business connections acquired
by a couple post marriage, a startup of a family business).
3of aggregate participation is somewhat novel. In connection to this, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2002)
present a reduced-form model of household specialization in which, for some parameter values, increasing
within-gender inequality has a greater impact on female labor supply than the closing of the gender gap.
To the extent that we study the aggregate and disaggregated responses of households to changes in
their potential earnings, without inquiring into the underlying causes of these changes, our paper is close
in spirit to Juhn and Murphy (1997). However, because we employ a family time allocation model and
work with the 1960-2000 U.S. census data, our methods and dataset are diﬀerent. Their main focus is
on documenting features of time allocation for disaggregated groups of couples. Qualitatively, the same
features carry over to our dataset.
We construct a model of heterogenous couples, in which the potential market earnings of husbands
and wives are jointly log-normally distributed. The assumption of log-normality enables us to correct for
the selection bias when calibrating the model. Spouses jointly decide on their time allocation between
market work, home production, and leisure. Because the change in married female labor supply occurred
predominantly at the extensive rather than intensive margin, we focus on the participation decision,
assuming that the market hours of work are fixed, although at diﬀerent levels for men and women, to
allow for a better fit with the data.4 The home consumption good is produced by combining home
appliances, purchased in the market, with perfectly substitutable male or female time.
We calibrate the parameters of the model to ensure a match with several important moments that we
document using the 2000 U.S. census data, such as the fraction of two-earner couples, several moments
of the observed group-specific earnings and hours worked conditional on participation. We then conduct
five counterfactual experiments within the calibrated model; the first four isolate the impact of diﬀerent
aspects of the earnings distribution, and the last one investigates the fall in the relative price of home
appliances. When estimating the parameters of the earnings distribution needed to conduct the experi-
ments, we face the selection bias problem, as the potential earnings of non-workers are not observed. In
order to correct for this selection bias and to take advantage of the observed characteristics of individuals
in our sample, we estimate parameters of the earnings distribution by applying a censored regression
model in conjunction with the participation (censoring) rule implied by the calibrated model. Finally,
the data on relative prices of home appliances, needed for conducting the last experiment, are taken from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The mechanism used in this paper embodies earnings heterogeneity across individuals and provides
clear predictions with respect to leisure time. This information helps in the evaluation of the relative
importance of each force examined. Thus, in addition to investigating the ability of each counterfactual
experiment to account for the observed aggregate trend in the fraction of two-earner couples, we also
test its predictions against the cross-sectional features of the rise in LFP of married females and trends
in leisure time experienced by married people. To briefly highlight these empirical facts, we document
that although female participation increased for all groups diﬀerentiated by husband’s real earnings, the
increase was greater for females married to men with labor earnings in the upper range of the distribution.
4 In fact, the data reveal that the hours worked by those who participate are concentrated around full-time work hours,
indicating that a decision to participate is a lumpy time investment. Moreover, a person’s working hours are not entirely
his/her choice, as they are often determined by the employer. The assumption of a discrete work choice is common in the
literature (e.g., Greenwood, 2003, Attanasio et al. 2006).
4Put diﬀerently, the strong negative correlation of female participation and the husband’s income in 1959
became much weaker by 1999. With regard to empirical leisure trends, we highlight that since 1965, both
working and stay-home wives experienced gains in leisure time, with a greater increase enjoyed by stay-
home wives. The average leisure time of married females, however, declined, due to the compositional
change, as more women joined the labor force.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized below.
i. We build a model of family decision making capable of shedding light on how diﬀerent aspects of
the joint potential earnings distribution of husbands and wives (the gender earnings gap, within-gender
inequality and assortativeness of matching) aﬀect aggregate time allocation.
ii. We quantitatively assess the impacts of changes in several aspects of the joint potential earnings
distribution and the decline in prices of home appliances on family time allocation since 1959. The model’s
structure and embodied heterogeneity allow us to subject the factors under consideration to empirical
tests, previously unexplored in this context. In particular, we investigate the implications of the factors
examined for (1) participation among groups of women disaggregated according to the husband’s earnings
and (2) gender-specific leisure trends among two-earner couples, one-earner couples, and on aggregate.
iii. We find that changes in the potential earnings distribution of husbands and wives account for
nearly 90% of the observed increase in LFP of married females. The decomposition of this overall impact
into the impact generated by each of the aspects reveals that the closing of the gender earnings gap drives
most of the aggregate increase in participation (accounting for over 70% of the observed rise) and in a
manner consistent with the cross-sectional pattern of female participation and changes in female leisure
among two-earner couples, one-earner couples and women on aggregate. The decline in the relative price
of home appliances accounts for only 5% of the rise in female LFP, while implying counterfactually strong
increases in gender-specific leisure time.
iv. Our work establishes the economic significance of the rise in purchasing power that results from
the closing of the gender gap, as we find that it generates widespread diﬀusion of home appliances,5
whereas the home production revolution is commonly regarded as an outcome of falling prices of home
appliances alone. It is through its eﬀect on purchases of home appliances that the closing of the gender
gap generates gains in leisure for both stay-home and working wives, with stay-home wives enjoying most
gains. Intuitively, as many of the one-earner male families are close to the case of full specialization
of stay-home wives in home production, stay-home wives do not share gains in leisure time from the
diﬀusion of home appliances with their spouses. As the closing of the gender gap generates a rise in the
fraction of dual-earner couples, the average female time spent on leisure falls, thus the composition eﬀect
dominating group-specific eﬀects, just as seen in the data.
v. In addition, our results shed light on reasons behind diﬀerent findings of Jones et al. (2003) and
Greenwood et al. (2005). Discussion of this is given in Section VIII.
It is important to emphasize that we employ a family decision making model that treats couples’
potential earnings and prices of home appliances as exogenously given. We do not inquire about the
underlying reasons for their change. Thus, our results only speak to the direct eﬀects of the distribution
5Greenwood et al. (2005) provides a comprehensive summary of the home production revolution that took place in the
U.S. in the 20th century.
5aspects and appliance prices on households’ time allocation choices.
Our results are important because they suggest that in order to understand the dramatic rise in
LFP of married women, it is essential to understand the determinants of the joint earnings distribution
of husbands and wives, and in particular, those leading to the closing of the gender gap. These can
potentially include the introduction of anti-discriminatory laws (Jones et al., 2003), factors aﬀecting
selection into marriage (Caucutt et al. 2002), changes in production technology, such as women-biased
technical change (Galor and Weil, 1996), changes in returns to experience (Olivetti, 2006), and finally,
factors aﬀecting women’s decisions regarding gains in education and experience, e.g., diﬀusion of the
contraceptive pill (Goldin and Katz, 2002), changes in cultural norms (Fernández et al. 2004), reduction
in the cost of child care (Attanasio et al. 2006), or improvement in home production technology.6 More
work is needed to disentangle the eﬀects of these various factors. Our work further suggests that decision
making at the household level should be incorporated in these attempts. Attanasio et al. (2006), which
uses a lifecycle model to investigate the relative importance of changes in returns to experience, cost
of child care and rate of depreciation of human capital when out of the labor force, is an example of
such a work. Similar in spirit is a work of Gayle and Golin (2006), which investigates the role of labor-
market attachment, on-the-job human-capital accumulation, occupational sorting and discrimination in
the closing of the gender gap and the increase in female experience.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the empirical trends in labor force
participation and leisure of married couples. The model is presented in Section III, and its calibration is
described in Section IV. Estimation of the earnings distribution parameters is given in Section V. The
main quantitative findings are reported in Section VI. Extensive sensitivity analysis is reported in Section
VII. In Section VIII, we compare our results to Jones et al. (2003) and Greenwood et al. (2005). Section
IX concludes.
II. Empirical Trends in the Time Allocation of Married Couples
We use the U.S. census data on married couples, restricting our attention to couples for which each of
the spouses is between the ages of 25 and 64.7 (See the appendix for more details on the sample.) All the
couples in the sample can be identified as either two-earner couples, male-earner couples, female-earner
couples, or no-earner couples. Since nearly the entire increase in the fraction of two-earner couples is
due to the decline in the fraction of male-earner couples, we choose to focus on only these two types of
couples, and eliminate female-earner and no-earner couples from the original sample. Note that in doing
so, we ignore only a small fraction of the married population (6%). Moreover, by focusing on the sample
in which only females suﬀer from selection bias, we significantly simplify the procedure of estimating
the joint earnings distribution. Note that in the remaining sample, two-earner couples are equivalent to
couples with working females.
6Note that the finding of this paper that the fall in appliance prices accounts for a very small part of the rise in female
LFP, does not rule out its indirect eﬀects. For example, a part of the eﬀect of falling prices of home appliances could be
manifested in the closing of the gender gap through its impact on education and experience gains.
7Since we do not model human capital accumulation, we consider only those individuals who are suﬃciently old that
they can be regarded as having completed their education.
6Note that the sample we are working with is diﬀerent from samples used in labor studies (e.g., Mulligan
and Rubinstein, 2008). Labor studies usually aim to estimate the returns to observable or unobservable
characteristics, the degree of gender discrimination, etc., and work with samples of white individuals
(not married couples) that are employed full time and full year. These studies refer to the gender gap
as the diﬀerence in gender-specific hourly wage not accounted for by diﬀerences in characteristics. By
contrast, we aim to study how household-level time allocation choice of all married couples of working age
is aﬀected by potential earnings and prices of home appliances. Hence, when estimating the distribution
of potential earnings (in Section V), we work with the same sample of married households for which we
report changes in participation, rather than full time full year working individuals. Also, what we refer
to as the gender gap is the diﬀerence in annual potential earnings of men and women, the measure not
purged of diﬀerences in gender characteristics, discrimination, or annual hours of work.
The main observation we investigate is the increase in the fraction of two-earner couples, from 0.33
to 0.76 during the period 1959-1999 (Figure 1). This increase in the aggregate female labor supply was
driven primarily by more women joining the workforce rather than working women extending their hours
of work (130% increase in participation rate vs. 17% increase in hours conditional on working). Since the
hours of work conditional on working changed relatively little (Figure 2), we focus solely on the extensive
margin. (Table 8 in the appendix reports descriptive statistics of the U.S. census sample used here.)
Notably, the increase in female LFP occurred across groups of couples diﬀerentiated according to the
husband’s earnings. Since all male labor earnings8 are observed in the sample, we were able to split the
couples into groups, characterized by the husband’s real income. Specifically, we split the sample into ten
groups, corresponding to the following arbitrarily chosen ranges of the husband’s labor income, measured
in 1999 dollars:9 (0, 12, 000], (12, 000, 24, 000], (24, 000, 36, 000], ..., (108, 000, +). Figure 3 plots female
participation as a function of the husband’s real income, revealing that female participation increased
for all groups of couples, but the increase was greater for females with husbands in the upper range of
the income distribution. Indeed, in 1959 less than 10% of females with husbands earning over 108, 000
per year participated in the workforce, while in 1999, this number was over 60%. Thus, in some sense,
female LFP became less tied to the husband’s earnings.10 Table 1 reports the percent change in female
LFP between 1959 and 1999 for couples diﬀerentiated according to the husband’s labor earnings.11
Table 1: Percent Change from 1959 to 1999 in Female LFP by the Interval of the Husband’s Earnings
Husband’s Income (in 000) [0,12] (12,24] (24, .] (36, .] (48, .] (60, .] (72, .] (84, .] (96, .] (108,+)
Data: %4 in Female LFP 52.7 56.4 75.7 96.7 116.9 124.9 134.9 137.6 140.9 150.3
Figure 4 highlights the rotation in the schedule of female LFP, by taking out the trend. Precisely,
each value reported in Figure 3 was divided by the average female participation in that year.
8Labor earnings are defined as the sum of wage and business income, the latter representing labor income for the
self-employed.
9We use CPI to compute real incomes.
10This cross-sectional feature of the aggregate increase in participation was also pointed out in Juhn and Murphy (1997).
11Percent change computations throughout the paper are based on a midpoint formula. This table essentially decomposes
the aggregate change ( 76%−33%.5(76%+33%) ≈ 80%) across subgroups of the married population.
7We also document several patterns in leisure. We use the dataset compiled from several time-use
surveys by Aguiar and Hurst (2006).12 The only modification here is that we retain the variable, contained
in the source files, that provides information regarding the spousal participation status. We use the same
sample characteristics guidelines (e.g., age group, marital status, working husband, etc.) as we applied
to the U.S. census data.
Time-use surveys are not representative of the married population in the U.S. In fact, 26.6% and 47.8%
of females declared that they work a positive number of hours in the 1965 and 2003 surveys, respectively,
whereas the corresponding numbers inferred from the U.S. census data are 39.7% and 76.2%.13 Thus,
while we use time-use surveys to obtain gender-specific trends in leisure for two-earner and male-earner
couples, to document the aggregate gender-specific trends, we combine group-specific findings for leisure
time with the composition numbers obtained from the census data.
We use the same activity variables as defined by Aguiar and Hurst (2006). However, to be consistent
with our conceptual framework, we compute leisure as a fraction of productive time not spent on market
or home work. First, we compute weekly productive time for each respondent as 24 × 7 less the time
spent on sleeping, eating and personal care. Weekly leisure hours are defined as the productive time less
the time spent working (including work-related travel) less the time spent on home production (including
basic child care, own medical care and care for others). To obtain leisure time as a fraction of productive
time, we divide weekly leisure hours by weekly productive time.14 Table 2 reports gender-specific time
allocation patterns for two-earner couples and couples with only the husband working. Aggregate gender-
specific time allocation patterns are computed using the composition of married couples from the census
data. (The fraction of two-earner couples in 1965 and 2003 are 39.7% and 76.2%.) We also report the
averages obtained from the time-use surveys.
The main qualitative patterns are summarized as follows.
(1) Working wives and stay-home wives both experienced an increase in leisure time.
(2) Stay-home wives enjoyed a greater increase in leisure time than working wives.
(3) Stay-home wives have always enjoyed greater leisure time than working wives.
(4) The average leisure time of married women declined due to the compositional change.
(5) The relative male-to-female leisure time declined among both male-earner and two-earner couples,
the larger decline experienced by two-earner couples.
(6) Married men experienced a slight reduction in leisure time on average. The main factor underlying
this change was the decline in leisure time (and an increase in home work time) of men among 2E couples
to a level comparable to that enjoyed by their wives.
We emphasize that even though both working and stay-home wives experienced an increase in leisure
time, the average leisure time of married females in our sample declined, due to the compositional change,
as more women joined the labor force, and working women enjoy less leisure.
12The dataset is available at http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~maguiar/timeuse_data/datapage.html.
13For 2003, we use the information on the composition from the 2000 census (76% of married women working) and for
1965, we use the linear interpolation of the 1960 and the 1970 census composition (39.7% of married women working).
14With the Stata variable names defined by Aguiar and Hurst (2006), our measure of leisure is [24×7- esp - work - (home
production + child_care_basic + own_medical_care + care_others)] / (24×7 - esp).
8Table 2. Time Allocation Trends: 1965-2003
Two-earner Couples Male-earner Couples Average Computed with Average in the
(working wives) (stay-home wives) Census Composition Time-Use Surveys
1965 2003 1965 2003 1965 2003 1965 2003
WOMEN
Work 0.51075 0.52679 0 0 0.20315 0.40256 0.13607 0.25442
Home Work 0.22967 0.18246 0.46925 0.38593 0.37406 0.23087 0.40555 0.28859
Leisure 0.2596 0.2908 0.5304 0.6095 0.4228 0.3666 0.45838 0.45699
MEN
Work 0.63704 0.60717 0.65746 0.61842 0.64935 0.60985 0.65095 0.61062
Home Work 0.05082 0.09418 0.04398 0.08218 0.0467 0.09133 0.04616 0.0905
Leisure 0.31214 0.29865 0.29856 0.29939 0.30395 0.29883 0.30289 0.29888
Leisurem/Leisuref 1.2024 1.0270 0.5629 0.4912 0.7189 0.8151 0.6608 0.6540
Note that the time allocated to work for working individuals (Table 2) appears much higher than that
reported in the census (Table 8); the diﬀerence arises from the diﬀerences in the precise definitions of
market work in the two surveys. Hence, we refrain from comparing these quantities to those generated by
the model.15 Here, we only wish to draw attention to the trends. The quantities in the last two columns
are presented only for curious readers, as the model’s predictions will not be compared to these.
III. Model
There is a continuum of measure 1 of heterogeneous households. Each household consists of two people,
a male and a female. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their earning ability. In particular,
couples i’s potential earnings are drawn from a bivariate log-normal distribution,
³
wim, w
i
f
´
∼ LN (m,S),
where m and S refer to the mean vector and covariance matrix of the log-normal distribution.16 This
distribution reflects both observable (e.g., education, age, experience, number of young children) and
non-observable (e.g., innate ability, ambition, leadership skills) characteristics of married individuals, as
well as the state of production technology, market conditions and factors aﬀecting selection into marriage.
Exploring the underlying reasons for changes in this distribution is outside the scope of this paper. We
only aim to investigate family time allocation decision for a given distribution.
All agents are endowed with 1 unit of productive time, which is allocated between market work
¡
l1
¢
,
home work
¡
l2
¢
and leisure
¡
1− l1 − l2
¢
. Agents have identical preferences over consumption of the
market good
¡
c1
¢
, consumption of the home good
¡
c2
¢
and leisure, represented by u
¡
c1, c2, 1− l1 − l2
¢
= µ log
¡
c1
¢
+ ν log
¡
c2
¢
+ (1− µ− ν) log
¡
1− l1 − l2
¢
. Motivated by the discussion in Section II, we
15There are other reasons for not making quantitative comparisons. One is that all the information reported is based
on weekly time allocation, whereas the model is based on a yearly time allocation. In addition, the time-use surveys only
extend back to 1965, while the model is employed to investigate the period 1959-1999.
16The convention is to write

wim, w
i
f

∼ LN (µ,Σ), where the parameters are the mean vector and covariance matrix of
the underlying normal distribution. Our notation, however, is more convenient for the purpose at hand. Note that there is
a one-to-one mapping between (µ,Σ) and (m,S) (see the appendix).
9assume that all men participate in market production. Furthermore, market hours are indivisible; i.e.,
the male works l¯1m, while the female chooses her market worktime from the set {0, l¯1f}. Market hours
diﬀer for working men and working women to allow for a better mapping of observables into the model.
Throughout the paper, individual variables are subscripted by the individual’s gender.
The home good is produced according to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production,
F (k, l) = [θkρ + (1− θ) lρ]1/ρ, where k denotes the stock of home appliances and l denotes family time
allocated to home production. Appliances are purchased in the market at the price q, measured in terms
of units of the market good.
Assuming that the bargaining problem within households is solved eﬃciently, each household’s prob-
lem can be written as a social planning problem, with λ denoting the relative weight of the male’s utility.
This weight represents the relative bargaining power of the husband. We assume it to be constant across
households and over time. (We return to this assumption later when discussing the results.17) Depending
on the maximum value associated with each time allocation choice, a household chooses to be either a
two-earner household (2E) or a male-earner household (1M). Formally, given its draw (wm, wf) , a couple
chooses max{V2E (wm, wf ) , V1M (wm, wf )}, where
V2E (wm, wf) = max
c1m,c2m,c
1
f ,c
2
f ,k,l
2
m,l
2
f
λ
£
µ log
¡
c1m
¢
+ ν log
¡
c2m
¢
+ (1− µ− ν) log
¡
1− l¯1m − l2m
¢¤
+(1− λ)
£
µ log
¡
c1f
¢
+ ν log
¡
c2f
¢
+ (1− µ− ν) log
¡
1− l¯1f − l2f
¢¤
s.t. c1m + c
1
f + qk ≤ wm + wf ,
c2m + c
2
f ≤ F
¡
k, l2m + l
2
f
¢
,(1)
0 ≤ l2j ≤ 1− l¯1j , j ∈ {m,f} ,
and V1M (wm, wf ) is identical to V2E (wm, wf) with wf = l¯1f = 0. Note from (1) that female and male
time inputs are perfect substitutes in home production.
After substituting for the optimal consumption of the market and home good, derived analytically,18
we simplify the maximum value functions associated with each of the two time allocation choices as
follows:
V2E (wm, wf) = max
k,l2m,l
2
f
µ log (wm + wf − qk) + ν log
¡
F
¡
k, l2m + l
2
f
¢¢
(2)
+(1− µ− ν)
£
λ log
¡
1− l¯1m − l2m
¢
+ (1− λ) log
¡
1− l¯1f − l2f
¢¤
+ κ
s.t. 0 ≤ k ≤ (wm +wf) /q,
0 ≤ l2j ≤ 1− l¯1j , j ∈ {m,f} .
Then, V1M (wm, wf ) is the special case of the above V2E(wm, wf ) with wf = l¯1f = 0. The constant
κ = (µ+ ν) (λ logλ+ (1− λ)ν log(1− λ)) is irrelevant for the household’s optimization problem.
17Alternatively, one could model the bargaining game explicitly as, for example, in Knowles (2005), or one could model
the relative weight as an explicit function of certain important factors, for example, relative earnings (Browning and Gortz,
2006).
18See Bar and Leukhina (2007) for details. Derivations of suﬃcient equilibrium conditions are included.
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The model implies a partition of the earnings space into two regions: 2E and 1M.We define the decision
rule threshold separating the two regions as a function L (wm) that solves V1M (wm, 0) = V2E (wm, L (wm)).
The solution can be found only numerically. Figure 5 illustrates the mechanism of the model pertaining
to the aggregate labor force participation. Any given point in the earnings space represents a possible
realization, (wm, wf ). The contour plots of the bivariate log-normal density indicate how the couples
are distributed over the space. Couples with potential earnings realizations above (below) the threshold
choose to be 2E (1M) households. (Couples with realizations on the decision threshold, (wm, wf ) =
(wm, L (wm)), are indiﬀerent.) In other words, the wife chooses to participate in market production if
and only if her potential earnings are large enough relative to those of her husband. Note that the
parameters of the earnings distribution determine where the couples are located in the earnings space,
while the rest of the parameters (λ, µ, ν, l¯1m, l¯
1
f , θ, ρ and q) determine the shape and location of the
decision rule threshold. As shown in the next proposition, two special cases of our model give rise to
a linear decision rule: one is the case with no home production (ν = 0),19 and one is the case with a
Cobb-Douglas home production function. With a general CES home production function, the decision
rule threshold is non-linear.
Proposition 1 In our model with (i) ν = 0 or (ii) a Cobb-Douglas home production function, the decision
rule threshold is a linear function with intercept zero. (Proof is given in the appendix.)
Note that both a downward shift of L (wm) and a shift in the mass of the distribution towards the
2E region cause an increase in the proportion of two-earner couples.
The result summarized in Proposition 2 allows us to interpret the drop in q as a capital-augmenting
technological change in home production.
Proposition 2 In our model, capital-augmenting technological progress in home production is equivalent
to a decline in the relative price of home appliances. (Proof is given in the appendix.)
IV. Calibration
For computational accuracy, it is convenient to work with the logs of the earnings rather than the
earnings themselves. Let X = log (wm) and Y = log (wf ), so that (X,Y ) ∼ N (µ,Σ).
Because the selection bias problem is least severe in the latest census (as only 24% of women in the
2000 census sample do not work), we choose to calibrate the model to 1999. Assuming 5000 hours of
annual productive time, the fixed work hours (conditional on working), l¯1m and l¯
1
f , are set to 0.44 and
0.34 respectively, to match their 1999 data counterparts.
Note that technological improvements in the home production sector aﬀect the relative returns to
work at home and in the market, but the direction of this eﬀect depends on the substitutability of inputs
in the home production. Consider a home good, say home-cooked meals, produced by combining home
appliances and labor. According to Proposition 2, the decline in the relative price of home appliances
is equivalent to the capital-augmenting technological change. If the inputs are complements, capital-
augmenting technological progress would cause households to allocate more labor to home production.
19Since preferences exclude utility from the home good, no home production will take place.
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If the inputs are substitutes, then capital-augmenting technological progress would have the opposite
eﬀect.20 We borrow parameters of the home production function, θ = 0.206 and ρ = 0.189, from the
estimation given in McGrattan et al. (1997), thus maintaining the assumption of substitutibility and not
ruling out the story of falling prices of home appliances.
We set the preference parameters as λ = 0.5, µ = 1/3, ν = 1/3, lacking criteria for making more
meaningful choices (see Section VII on sensitivity). The remaining parameters are those of the earnings
distribution and the relative price of home appliances, Θ ≡ (µX , µY , σX , σY , σXY , q).
We calibrate Θ to match several important 1999 data moments, summarized in Table 3. The last
moment helps us capture the cross-sectional feature of participation, namely, that in 1999, female partic-
ipation was not closely tied to the husband’s earnings.
Table 3. Summary of Moments Used for Calibration, 1999
0.2379 Proportion of 1M couples
10.537 Mean of log of male earnings
0.7543 Variance of log of male earnings
9.802 Mean of log of the working (observed) female earnings
1.1266 Variance of log of the working (observed) female earnings
0.2285 Proportion of 1M couples among couples with log(wm) below the mean
Denoting these data moments byM and the corresponding moments implied by the model byM (Θ) ,
we calibrate the remaining parameters, Θ ≡ (µX , µY , σX , σY , σXY , q), by solving the following mini-
mization problem:
(3) min
Θ
6X
i=1
µ Mi −Mi (Θ)
0.5 (Mi +Mi (Θ))
¶2
.
Bar and Leukhina (2007) present derivations of M (Θ) and discuss the numerical integration methods
adopted in its computation.21 Table 4 summarizes the calibrated parameters.22
Table 4. Summary of Calibrated Parameters
Category Value
Preferences λ = 0.5, µ = 1/3, ν = 1/3,
Market hours l¯1m = 0.44, l¯
1
f = 0.34,
Home production θ = 0.206, ρ = 0.189, q = 0.99586,
Earnings distribution µX = 10.374, µY = 9.5586,
σX = 0.86894, σY = 1.2346, σXY = 0.66739.
20 In fact, Aguiar and Hurst (2006) use the substitutability of inputs (labor and capital in our case) to classify an activity
as home production.
21Diﬃculty arises when computing the moments in the model, because the limit of the integration, i.e., a point on the
decision rule threshold, must be found for every point at which we evaluate the integrand. This threshold must be computed
numerically by equating the value functions of the 2E and 1M problems, which may have corner solutions.
22As a part of the robustness check, we repeated the entire analysis performed in this paper under a slightly diﬀerent
calibration procedure. Instead of setting µ, ν and λ as we do here, we allowed these to vary along with Θ in the minimization
problem (3), with the initial values for the minimizers taken from Table 4. Although the match improved significantly when
this was done, the overall results obtained were very similar to those presented here.
12
V. Estimation of the Earnings Distribution Parameters
Although the calibration procedure yields the parameters of the potential earnings distribution for
1999, it does not do so for the rest of the years under consideration. Since one of our goals is to study
households’ responses to changes in all aspects of the joint earnings distribution over the period 1959-1999,
we must first estimate these changes.
Because of the non-random selection of women into workforce, we cannot simply set the earnings distri-
bution parameters to their data counterparts. To overcome the selection bias, we predict the unobserved
earnings by employing the year-specific censored regression model in conjunction with the participation
(censoring) rule implied by the calibrated model. Once the unobserved earnings are predicted, we infer
(mt,St) from their sample counterparts for t = 1959, 1969, ..., 1999. These are then used to conduct the
counterfactual experiments in the context of the calibrated model.
Formally, the censored regression model is given by
y∗i = xiβ + ui, ui ∼ N
¡
0, σ2
¢
,(4)
yi =
(
y∗i if y
∗
i ≥ p (zi,Ω)
0 otherwise
,(5)
where y∗i denotes the log of the potential earnings of married female i, and xi denotes her personal at-
tributes, which determine her potential earnings, such as years of education, experience, race (see the
appendix). Use of the Mincer equation (4) allows us to extract information from individuals’ charac-
teristics observed in our sample when predicting the missing potential earnings. If female i chooses to
work, her potential earnings are revealed; i.e. the log of her observed earnings, yi, is equal to y∗i . The
participation rule, y∗i ≥ p (zi,Ω), is given by the time allocation decision rule implied by our calibrated
model. Note the explicit dependence on the log of the husband’s income, zi, and the parameters of
the model, Ω = (λ,µ,ν, l¯1m, l¯
1
f , θ, ρ, q). Thus, our procedure is similar to applying a standard Heckman
selection model,23 but with the selection rule implied by a micro-founded model.
Since we apply this censored regression model to each year separately, the participation rule y∗i ≥
p (zi,Ω) is also year-specific, as we adjust q to reflect the fall in the relative price of home appliances over
time, while the rest of the parameters remain fixed at their calibrated values.24 , 25
Note that we do not aim to develop a novel procedure for the earnings estimates. The purpose of
23This is a standard model of selection used in labor literature. See Heckman (1979).
24First, if q were fixed at its calibrated value, our main result, that the closing of the gender earnings gap was the main
driving force behind the rise in the female LFP, would be reinforced. Consider, for example, estimating potential earnings
for non-working females in 1959. In case of the low level of q implied by the 1999 calibration, the participation rule would
have a relatively small slope (as home appliances and labor are substitutes in home production), resulting in lower values
of predicted missing earnings, and hence a larger estimated gender earnings gap in 1959. A more dramatic closing of the
gender gap would then reinforce its quantitative power. Second, even though the results would be reinforced, the change
would be quantitatively small, because the decision rule threshold is not very sensitive to changes in q.
25The fact that we keep the relative bargaining power, reflected in λ, fixed throughout the entire period under consideration
may appear to be problematic. Let us consider the implications of allowing women to gain more bargaining power over time
(a decrease in λ). Given our calibration, this would result in a threshold with a relatively small slope in 1959. Hence, the
predicted values for the missing earnings in 1959 would be lower, and our estimates would imply a greater closing in the
gender gap over the period 1959-1999. Thus, allowing λ to decline over time would reinforce the quantitative importance of
the closing gender gap.
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applying the year-specific censored regression model along with our model used to provide participation
(censoring) rules is simply to obtain estimates of the earnings distribution parameters employed in the
counterfactual experiments. In our model, individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their earnings
potential, but the model is silent regarding factors that underly this heterogenity. Rather, it only provides
results concerning family time allocation across diﬀerent activities. However, the dataset contains a great
deal of information about personal characteristics useful for assessing individual earnings potential. Thus,
employing the Mincer regression given in (4) within the context of our model, used to correct for the
selection bias, appears to be a natural procedure for estimating {mt,St}t=1959, 1969,.... The derivation of
the log-likelihood function is given in the appendix. In Section VII on sensitivity, we also study how our
results change if the Heckman selection model was applied to arrive at these estimates.
The estimated censored regression model is used to predict the log of potential earnings of stay-
home women, thus filling in the missing values. We then convert logs into annual earnings. Finally, we
record {mt,St}t=1959, 1969,... from the completed sample. Table 5 highlights our findings by reporting the
estimated means, coeﬃcients of variation, correlation coeﬃcient, and the gender earnings gap.
Table 5. Aspects of the Estimated Joint Earnings Distribution
Parameter \ year, t 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999
m1 36712 47597 47382 48078 52888
m2 6779 11434 13702 18958 23739
CV1 = s1/m1 0.781 0.744 0.769 0.849 1.035
CV2 = s2/m2 1.212 0.997 0.977 0.956 1.075
ρ =s12/ (s1s2) 0.004 0.042 0.052 0.143 0.159
GG = m2/m1 0.185 0.240 0.289 0.394 0.449
We reiterate that these estimates are not directly comparable to those derived in studies of wage
distributions. First, we consider all married individuals of working age and regard a person to be a
worker if he/she works a positive number of hours, while most related studies consider full-time full-
year working-age employees. Second, while other studies consider either hourly wages or annual labor
earnings of full-time full-year individuals, we consider annual labor incomes without controlling for gender
diﬀerences in hours worked, or any other characteristic. In fact, women work much less on average in our
sample, which is reflected in their annual earnings. These two facts are responsible for the large size in
our measure of the gender discrepancy in annual earnings.26
We find that the gender earnings gap, corrected for the selection bias, narrowed monotonically (m2/m1
increased by 143% over the 40 years), in contrast to the pattern in the observed gender earnings gap,
which remained roughly unchanged until the 1980s. To a large extent, the closing of the gap is due to
gains in observable characteristics. Finally, we find that within-gender inequality increased for men and
slightly decreased for women. Also, note that the estimated correlation of husbands’ and wives’ earnings
increased over time, although remaining at a very low value even today.
26Note that even the observed gap for 1999 (see Table 8) is very large: 27303/50097=0.545.
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VI. Quantitative results
A. Counterfactual Experiments
To recap, we calibrated the model to match several important moments in 1999. Year-specific censored
regressions with the censoring rule, generated by the calibrated model and adjusted for 1959, 1969, ...,
1989 to reflect the fall in the relative price of home appliances over time, were applied to the dataset and
used to predict the unobserved earnings of stay-home females. The mean vectors and covariance matrices
of the year-specific completed samples, {mt,St}t=1959,1969... , provided the estimates of the moments of
year-specific earnings distribution faced by households. Table 5 reports changes in several aspects of the
distribution imputed from these estimates.
One of our goals is to assess the impact of changes in the entire earnings distribution and isolate
the impact of its various aspects. Note that the mean vector and covariance matrix, m and S, of any
bivariate distribution can be represented by either of the following two forms:"
m1
m2
#
,
"
(m1CV1)
2 ρ (m1CV1) (m2CV2)
ρ (m1CV1) (m2CV2) (m2CV2)
2
#
,(6)
"
m1+m2
1+GG
GG(m1+m2)
1+GG
#
,
⎡
⎣
³
CV1(m1+m2)
1+GG
´2
ρ
³
CV1(m1+m2)
1+GG
´³
CV2(GG)(m1+m2)
1+GG
´
ρ
³
CV1(m1+m2)
1+GG
´³
CV2(GG)(m1+m2)
1+GG
´ ³
CV2(GG)(m1+m2)
1+GG
´2
⎤
⎦ ,(7)
where GG = m2/m1 is the gender earnings gap (a measure of inequality between genders), CV1 = s1/m1
and CV2 = s2/m2 are gender-specific coeﬃcients of variation (a measure of inequality within gender i),
m1 +m2 represents the potential purchasing power, and ρ = s12/ (s1s2) is the correlation of spousal po-
tential earnings. Note that the first representation expresses the distribution parameters in terms of the
mean vector, gender-specific inequality and correlation alone. Representation (7) provides a more detailed
look into the aspects of the distribution, as it further breaks down the mean vector into the relative female
to male earnings and purchasing power of the potential household income. It is obtained from represen-
tation (6) by setting m1 = (m1 +m2) / (1 +GG) and m2 = GG (m1 +m2) / (1 +GG). Conducting the
counterfactual experiments whose goal is to isolate the impact of each of the aspects of the distribution
amounts to computing the appropriate experimental distribution parameters {mExp jt ,SExp jt }t=1959,1969...
and then feeding them into the calibrated model.
Experiment 1: Changes in the entire earnings distribution. We allow all of the distribution para-
meters to vary across time according to our estimates; that is, the experimental distribution parameters
are set to the distribution estimates, {mExp 1t ,SExp 1t }t=1959,1969... = {mt,St}t=1959,1969.... The remaining
parameters of the model, including the relative price of home appliances, are kept at their calibrated
values. We solve the model for each year. We then interpret the model’s predictions regarding time
allocation, say for 1989, as revealing what the time allocation patterns would have been in 1989 if the
environment in 1989 were identical to that of 1999, with the only diﬀerence being the parameters of the
potential earnings distribution.
Experiment 2: Changes in the mean vector: closing of the gender earnings gap and the rise in
purchasing power. We let the mean values of husbands’ and wives’ potential earnings vary across time
according to the distribution estimates, {mExp 2t }t=1959,1969... = {mt}t=1959,1969.... In order to keep the
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correlation and coeﬃcients of variation fixed at the 1999 level (thus isolating the eﬀect of the mean vector
alone), we compute {SExp 2t }t=1959, 1969,... according to (6), in which we use the year-specific mean values
but keep CV1, CV2 and ρ at their 1999 levels from Table 5.
To complement Experiment 2, we conduct two additional experiments. This allows us to decompose
the impact from changing the mean vector into the impact due to the increase in the purchasing power
associated with it, m1+m2 (Experiment 2.1), and the impact due to the change in the relative earnings,
m2/m1 (Experiment 2.2). We obtain {mExp 2.1t ,SExp 2.1t }t=1959,1969... from (7) , in which we use the year-
specific m1 and m2, while keeping GG, CV1, CV2 and ρ at their 1999 levels given in Table 5. Similarly,
{mExp 2.2t ,SExp 2.2t }t=1959,1969... are computed from (7) , using the year-specificGG, while keepingm1+m2,
CV1, CV2 and ρ at their 1999 levels.27
Experiment 3: Changes in within-gender inequality. This experiment aims to isolate the impact of
changing within-gender inequality. We compute {mExp 3t ,SExp 3t }t=1959,1969... from (7) by letting gender-
specific coeﬃcients of variations, CV1 and CV2, vary across time (Table 5), while keeping other aspects
of the distribution, m1 +m2, GG and ρ, at their estimated values for 1999.
Experiment 4: Changes in assortativeness of matching. We isolate the impact of the growing
correlation between husbands’ and wives’ earnings by computing {mExp 4t ,SExp 4t }t=1959,1969... from (6) ,
in which we vary ρ across time according to its estimates from Table 5, while keeping m1, m2, GG, CV1,
CV2 at their estimated values for 1999.
Experiment 5: Changes in the relative price level of home appliances. In addition to investigating the
impact of diﬀerent aspects of the earnings distribution, we also study the impact of the fall in the relative
price level of home appliances. National Income and Product Accounts Table 2.5.4 provides detailed price
indices for numerous components of personal consumption expenditures. According to those, the relative
price of durable consumption to non-durable consumption halved in the period under consideration, while
the relative price of housing operation, a category including electricity, gas, telephone and water, did not
change over the time period under consideration. The change in a more narrow category, titled "kitchen
and other household appliances" (item 30),28 was most dramatic. Table 6 reports the price index of this
category relative to the price index of personal consumption expenditures. This series is normalized to 1
in 1999. We set q1999 to the calibrated value and vary it across time in accordance with the price index
of appliances, given in Table 6. The rest of the parameters, including the parameters of the earnings
distribution, are kept at their calibrated values.
27The distribution parameters corresponding to Experiment 2.2 are such that the mean value of male earnings declines
over time (as GG increases), in order to eliminate the income eﬀect associated with both male and female income growth.
It may, however, be more natural to eliminate only the income eﬀect associated with male income growth. After all, the
"catching up" of female earnings inevitably incorporates the increase in purchasing power. Hence, we also perform an
experiment (Experiment 2.3) isolating the eﬀect of the closing of the gender gap compiled with the purchasing power due to
the female income growth. We compute the experimental distribution from the representation of m and S given in footnote
3, in which we use the year-specific GG, but keep m1, CV1, CV2 and ρ at their 1999 levels. Because m1 stagnated over the
years (except in the 1960s), most gains in purchasing power m1+m2 are due to m2, so the results generated by Experiment
2.3 are very close to those of Experiment 2 (which incorporates the closing of the gender gap and the rise of purchasing power
due to both male and female incomes). In the 1960s, the quantitative results lie between those generated by Experiment 2
and those generated by Experiment 2.2. We do not focus on the results of Experiment 2.3, because the main message they
provide is the same as that provided by Experiment 2.
28This category includes refrigerators, freezers, cooking ranges, dishwashers, laundry equipment, stoves, room air condi-
tioners, sewing machines, vacuum cleaners and other appliances.
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Table 6. Index of the Relative Price of Home Appliances
1959 1969 1979 1989 1999
3.112 2.312 1.848 1.347 1
B. Aggregate Implications for Female LFP
Figure 6 summarizes the impact of the main counterfactual experiments performed in the framework
of the calibrated model on the evolution of the fraction of 2E couples. The bold line represents the
empirical trend.29 To assess the quantitative significance of the channels explored in this paper, we
compare changes generated by our experiments with the corresponding changes in the data.
The overall change in the fraction of two-earner couples in the data during the period 1959-1999 was
79% (from 0.33 to 0.762). We find that changing the entire earnings distribution (Experiment 1) within
the framework of the calibrated model generates a smaller rise, of about 69.6% (from 0.36 to 0.747), thus
accounting for 88% of the observed increase in the fraction of two-earner couples (69.6% out of 79%).
Experiment 2, which isolates the impact due to changing gender-specific means, generates a rise in the
fraction of 2E couples from 0.416 to 0.747, accounting for 72% of the observed change and hence appearing
to be the aspect of the distribution with the most important quantitative implication for married female
LFP. Also note that in the 1970s, the closing of the gap appears to be less important, although still more
important than other channels considered in this paper.
Decomposing the impact from Experiment 2 into an impact arising from the increase in the purchasing
power and an impact arising from the change in the relative earnings reveals that nearly the entire eﬀect
on the aggregate female participation is due to the latter change. Indeed, Experiment 2.1 generates a
very small rise in female participation (from 0.734 to 0.747), while Experiment 2.2 generates a substantial
rise (from 0.432 to 0.747), nearly identical to the rise implied by Experiment 2.
Other aspects of the earnings distribution have a much smaller impact on women’s participation, with
the change in within-gender inequality (Experiment 3) accounting for 10% of the empirical trend, and
the assortative matching (Experiment 4) for 4%.
Finally, the decline in the relative price of home appliances (Experiment 5), accounts for a very small
part (5%) of the observed rise in the fraction of two-earner couples.
C. Cross-sectional Implications
Note that we used neither the cross-sectional participation patterns nor leisure patterns in the calibra-
tion of the model. However, each experiment generates clear predictions with respect to these quantities,
hence providing an additional test for evaluating the relative importance of diﬀerent channels. We de-
scribe the cross-sectional implications of our experiments for participation and leisure, contrasting them
with the corresponding empirical trends.
29 It should be noted that because the selection bias is relatively small in 1999 and we use the selection rule predicted
by the model, the obtained parameters of the earnings distribution for 1999 are in close accordance with the calibrated
parameters for the earnings distribution reported in Table 4. There is, however, still a small mismatch in the fraction of
two-earner couples at the initial point between the data (0.762) and the model (0.747).
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Recall that Figure 3 illustrates female participation as a function of the husband’s labor income in
1999 dollars. Participation increased during each decade and for nearly all intervals of the husband’s
income, except for the second interval (12,000 - 24,000], in the 1990s.30 The magnitude of the increase
was larger for women with husbands in the upper intervals.
The analogs to Figures 3 and 4 generated by Experiment 2 are given by Figures 7 and 8. We
do not report the cross-sectional implications associated with changing the entire earning distribution
(Experiment 1), as they are largely driven by changes in the mean vector (Experiment 2). As a result
of Experiment 2, female participation increases across all intervals of the husband’s income during the
period 1959-1999, but the increase is more significant for females with husbands in the upper range of the
distribution (Table 7). Comparing the results reported in Table 7 to their data counterparts reported in
Table 1 confirms that the mean vector of the earnings distribution drives not only the overall increase in
female LFP but also the cross-sectional schedule of female LFP as a function of the husband’s income.31
Table 7. Experiment 2: Percent 4 in Female LFP by the Interval of the Husband’s Earnings, [1959-1999]
Husband’s Income (in 000) [0,12] (12,24] (24, .] (36, .] (48, .] (60, .] (72, .] (84, .] (96, .] (108,+)
Model: %4 in female LFP 25 54.9 80.8 99 112.4 122.6 130.7 137.2 142.6 153.2
The asymmetric eﬀect experienced by couples across diﬀerent income intervals is driven by both the
increase in the purchasing power and the change in the relative earnings, associated with changing the
mean vector. As a result of Experiment 2.1 (change in m1 +m2), couples in the lowest interval increase
participation by 3.8%, while couples in the top interval do by 53%. Due to the relatively low correlation
of spousal earning ability, for most couples in the category of low husband income, the gender gap is
already narrow in 1959. Moreover, females with husbands at the lower end of the distribution have lower
reservation earnings. Hence, these women already experienced high participation rates in 1959 and had
less to gain, despite being more strongly aﬀected by the diﬀusion of home appliances. Note that there is
no inconsistency of the result that couples across all income intervals are positively aﬀected by the rise in
purchasing power and the result, reported above, that the aggregate impact on participation generated by
Experiment 2.1 is negligible: due to the downward sloping schedule of female participation as a function of
the husband’s income, the eﬀect of changing the composition of couples across the intervals obtained from
this experiment (mExp 2.11,1959 < m
Exp 2.1
1,1999 ) works to substantially reduce the aggregate impact. As a result
of Experiment 2.2 (change in GG), female participation among couples in the lowest interval increases
by 11.3%, while couples in the top interval experience a much larger increase of 105.6%.32 The intuition
obtained from this experiment is similar to the one obtained from Experiment 2.1, except that diﬀusion
30As suggested in Bar and Leukhina (2007), female participation among many couples in this income range was negatively
aﬀected by the major expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 1990s.
31The model, however, generates participation rates in 1999 that are too high for low income intervals and too low for high
income intervals. The reason is that our estimate of the correlation of spousal labor incomes is positive but low, resulting
in high relative earnings of females married to husbands at the bottom of the earnings distribution. In reality, husbands
with low labor income may have other sources of income, not incorporated into our model (e.g., welfare or dividend income,
income from informal activities, and family transfers).
32Compare these percent changes to the corresponding 25% and 153.2% generated by Experiment 2 (Table 7). It may at
first seem puzzling that the aggregate increase in the fraction of 2E couples generated by Experiment 2.2 is nearly identical
to that generated by Experiment 2, yet, when decomposing the aggregate increase into income intervals, the contribution
obtained from Experiment 2.2 appears somewhat smaller. There is no inconsistency of the two results: due to the downward
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of home appliances is even across all categories of husbands’ income. Closing the gender gap does not
have as strong an eﬀect on females with husbands in lower income intervals, as they already experienced
high levels of participation.
Recall that changing within-gender inequality (Experiment 3) did little to explain trends in aggregate
participation; we find that it is also unimportant for the cross-sectional schedule, which remains roughly
unchanged.
Figure 9 demonstrates the cross-sectional implications of the increase in the assortativeness of match-
ing (Experiment 4). Because this experiment generates a very small rise in aggregate female participation
(3.33%), we report the participation pattern relative to the year’s average, in order to only highlight the
relative impact experienced by couples across diﬀerent income intervals (Figure 9). Increasing correla-
tion tends to close the average gender gap for women with husbands in the upper range of the earnings
distribution (18% rise in E (m2) /E (m1) for the top interval), encouraging their participation, and to
widen it for women with husbands in the lower range (35% fall in E (m2) /E (m1) for the lowest inter-
val), thus inducing a fall in their participation. Thus, increasing assortativeness of matching appears
to partly contribute to the rotation of the female participation schedule as a function of the husband’s
income. It also appears that the seemingly small aggregate impact of Experiment 4 fails to reflect a
greater impact experienced by disaggregated groups of couples. In particular, the experiment generates
an increase in female LFP of as much as 18.2%, 22.4% and 38.2% for couples in the top three income
intervals, respectively.
The fall in the relative price of appliances generates a modest increase in wives’ participation across
all levels of the husbands’ labor income, with a greater impact experienced by couples in the top intervals
(Figure 10). The impact ranges from less than 2% increase in participation for the lower two intervals to
increases of 9% and 11% for the top two intervals.
D. Implications for the Diﬀusion of Home Appliances and Leisure Trends
Up to this point, we have demonstrated that changes in the mean vector of the earnings distribution
experienced by married couples account for a large part of the aggregate rise in female LFP as well as
participation trends for groups of females disaggregated according to the husband’s income. Decomposing
this impact reveals that it is the change in the relative female-to-male earnings that predominantly drives
the aggregate and disaggregated participation trends. The remaining discussion will reveal that the
increase in the purchasing power associated with the change in the mean vector (primarily due to female
incomes catching up, as male incomes stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s) also has quantitatively important
implications, as it generates a widespread diﬀusion of home appliances and group-specific leisure trends,
in close match with their empirical counterparts.
In what follows, we will focus on implications of Experiment 2 (and its decomposition into Experiments
2.1 and 2.2) and Experiment 5 regarding purchases of home appliances and group-specific leisure trends.33
sloping schedule of female participation as a function of the husband’s income, the change in the composition of couples
across the intervals implied by Experiment 2.2 works to boost the aggregate impact (mExp 2.21,1959 > m
Exp 2.2
1,1999 ), while the opposite
is true for Experiment 2 (mExp 21,1959 < m
Exp 2
1,1999).
33We do not discuss Experiments 3 and 4 because we find them to be quantitatively unimportant in driving the diﬀusion
of home appliances and leisure trends. Experiment 1 is left out of the discussion because it generates results that are nearly
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Finally, we will show that even though Experiment 5 produces a greater diﬀusion of home appliances
than that implied by Experiment 2, its implication for female leisure trends is in contradiction with the
data.
As a result of Experiment 2, the average expenditure on home appliances (k) increases by 60%. This
impact is mainly due to the increase in purchasing power, as Experiment 2.1 yields nearly the same
increase (58%). In Experiment 5, a three-fold decline in the price of home appliances leads to a larger
(112%) increase in k.34 As home appliances diﬀuse through diﬀerent subsets of the married population,
they influence time allocated to leisure.
Figures 11-16 summarize leisure trends generated by Experiments 2 and 5. The change in leisure
trends generated by Experiment 2 is also mainly due to the increase in purchasing power. First, note
from Figures 11 and 12 that men with stay-home wives enjoy less leisure time on average than their
spouses. Also note that for each year, the average leisure time of men with stay-home wives is very
close to 1− l¯m, indicating that nearly all 1M couples are in the case of complete specialization, in which
the optimal production of the home good is reached with only the wife’s time. Hence, men with stay-
home wives experience a nearly zero increase in leisure due to both Experiments 2 and 5, as very few of
them devote any time to home production and thus have something to gain from the diﬀusion of home
appliances. Their wives, on the other hand, enjoy a much greater increase in leisure (3.63% (3.25%) due
to Experiment 2 (Experiment 2.1) and 6.8% due to Experiment 5), because they do not have to share
gains from the greater use of home appliances with their spouses. This finding provides economic insight
into why the relative male-to-female leisure declined among 1M couples (a 3.5% (3.2%) drop as a result
of Experiment 2 (Experiment 2.1) and a 6.3% drop as a result of Experiment 5, see Figure 13). All of
these implications are qualitatively in line with their empirical counterparts reported in Table 2.
All 2E couples in the calibrated model reach an interior optimal solution. It is then optimal to
allocate the same amount of leisure time to both spouses because λ = 0.5. The wife works fewer hours
in the market (l¯1m > l¯
1
f) but works more at home. Since both spouses work at home, they both enjoy an
increase in leisure associated with the greater use of appliances (Figure 14). The 4.4% increase implied
by Experiment 5 is again greater than the 2.8% (2.1%) rise due to Experiment 2 (Experiment 2.1).
The prediction that both spouses experienced equal gains in leisure, shared by both experiments, is
counterfactual. In fact, Table 2 reveals that the relative male-to-female leisure among two-earner couples
dropped significantly, from 1.2 to 1. This suggests that the bargaining process has drastically changed
among these couples and provides further motivation for works explicitly modeling spousal bargaining
(e.g., Knowles, 2005).
Comparison of Figures 12 and 14 reveals that on average, stay-home women enjoy more leisure than
working women, which is in close agreement with the data. Also in line with our empirical findings,
Experiments 2 and 5 predict that stay-home wives enjoyed a higher increase in leisure than working
wives, again because stay-home wives devote more time to home production and thus have more to gain
from the diﬀusion of home appliances.
identical to those of Experiment 2.
34The changes in the ratio k/c2, which captures the evolution of capital intensity in household production, convey a similar
message. Experiment 2 generates a 24% increase of this ratio, most of the increase arising from the change in the purchasing
power, as Experiment 2.1 generates a comparable (20.7%) increase. Experiment 5 generates a larger (45%) increase in k/c2.
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Figure 15 reports the leisure trend averaged over all women, thus incorporating the composition eﬀect.
Consistently with our empirical findings, Experiment 2 (and Experiment 2.1) predicts that although
both working and stay-home females increase their leisure, the average female leisure declines due to the
composition eﬀect, as more women work in the market today, and working women enjoy less leisure.
Recall that Experiment 5 generates stronger group-specific leisure gains; it also predicts a very weak
composition eﬀect, as it generates very little change in the fraction of 2E couples. Thus, Experiment 5
implies that leisure time averaged over all married women increases (Figure 15), in contradiction with
the empirical trend (Table 2).
Finally, Figure 16 illustrates that the qualitative predictions for the average leisure of men are similar
to those for women, with the negative composition eﬀect dominating for Experiment 2 and the positive
group-specific eﬀect dominating for Experiment 5. Although Experiment 2 generates a fall in male leisure,
as seen in the data, this fall is due to the composition eﬀect, while in the data, it is mainly due to the
drop in male leisure among 2E couples, which the model fails to generate, as discussed above.
It can be concluded that the increase in purchasing power associated with changes in the mean vector
of the earnings distribution generates a widespread use of home appliances and leisure trends that are
qualitatively consistent with empirical leisure trends experienced by working women, stay-home women
and women on average. It also accounts for the fall in the relative male-to-female leisure among 1M
couples. It appears that to account for the fall in relative male-to-female leisure among 2E couples, one
would need to extend the model to allow for a change in bargaining power. As discussed in Section V,
allowing for λ to drop over time would only reinforce our finding that the narrowing of the gender gap
was a more important force than the decline in prices of home appliances.
VII. Sensitivity Analysis
Earnings definition adjusted for discrepancy in annual hours
Clearly, a low income observation in our sample does not necessarily imply the person has a low
earning ability, as he/she may be working only part-time. We repeated the entire analysis of this paper
under an alternative definition of labor income, aimed to capture each person’s full time earnings based
on his or her part-time earning ability. Precisely, we created an artificial income variable, which consists
of the observed labor income adjusted by the discrepancy between his/her annual hours worked and the
gender-specific and year-specific average hours in the sample. For example, if a person worked 1000 hours
in 1999, earning $20,000 in that year, while the average male hours were 2215.4, we create an adjusted
income for that person of $20,000(2215.4/1000). We recalibrated the model, and following the procedure
in Section V, we estimated the parameters of the adjusted earnings distribution for each decade. We
found that the closing of the gender gap is monotonic from 0.2 to 0.46. Further, all the results are
quantitatively very close to those obtained using annual earnings.
A larger drop in the price of home appliances
We also performed an experiment of a 25-fold drop in q (as opposed to the 3-fold drop investigated
by Experiment 5). This change is equivalent to an 8.3% annual drop in the relative price of home
appliances, the quantity used in Greenwood et al. (2005). Although this experiment generates a larger
rise in the fraction of two-earner couples, accounting for 14.5% of the rise found in the data, it still
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appears to be a less important channel than the closing of the gender gap.35 Moreover, it implies even
larger leisure increases among working and stay-home wives (11.7% and 15.34%), which were already
counterfactually large in the original Experiment 5. By contrast, Table 2 reveals that stay-home wives,
although experiencing the largest gains in leisure relative to other groups, enjoyed a much smaller rise
of 6.9%. Recall that in the data, the average female leisure declined due to the composition eﬀect. This
experiment, however, generates a 10.8% increase in leisure for women on average.
Estimation of the Earnings Distribution using the Heckman selection model
It is also possible to use the Heckman selection model to estimate the parameters of the earnings
distribution used in our experiments, instead of microfounding the selection rule with our calibrated
model. The Heckman model is given by
y∗i = xiβ + ui,(8)
yi =
(
y∗i if z
∗
i > 0
0 otherwise
,(9)
where z∗i = wiγ + vi, and the error terms are jointly normally distributed:"
ui
vi
#
∼ N
Ã"
0
0
#
,
"
σ2 ρσ
ρσ 1
#!
.
Again, y∗i denotes the log of the potential earnings of female i, while yi denotes the observed log of
her potential earnings. We use years of education, potential years of experience and potential years of
experience squared as the components of xi. In addition to these, wi includes the log of the husband’s
annual earnings. Using the maximum likelihood method, we estimate the model for each census year
separately, finding that the marginal eﬀect of the log of the husband’s earnings on probability of partic-
ipation is always significantly negative, and it becomes less negative over time (from −0.16 in 1959 to
−0.05 in 1999). Using the predicted values to complete the sample of logs of earnings and exponentiat-
ing, we record {mt,St}t=1959, 1969,..., again obtaining a monotonic closing of the gender gap since 1959,36
although the closing is less drastic than that obtained in Section V (62% vs. 83%).37 It is possible to
35 In fact, closing the gender gap by only half the amount investigated in Experiment 2.2 still accounts for a larger part
of the aggregate increase in female participation (21%) than a 25-fold drop in q.
36{m2/m1}1959,...,1999 = {0.2528, 0.3064, 0.3429, 0.4268, 0.4803}.
37Using a similar Heckman selection model, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) (hereafter MR) argue that the observed
closing of the gender gap between the late 1970s and the late 1990s was due to changing composition of women in the
workforce from those with relatively low to those with relatively high unmeasured characteristics, and not due to changes in
the degree of discrimination or measured characteristics. MR work with Current Population Survey sample of both single and
married individuals. They regard a female as a participant if she works full time full year and use a two-step estimator of the
Heckman model. To facilitate comparison of our results to those of MR, we performed a two-step estimation of the Heckman
model, including the number of small children in addition to characteristics used in wi, including men in the second step and
a female dummy in addition to characteristics used in xi, and using our measure of adjusted income. The inverse Mills ratio
is set to zero for men, as all men in our sample work. The observed gender gap, E (y∗i |working woman)− E (y∗i |man) , can
be decomposed into gender diﬀerence in the valuation of observed characteristics, E (xiβ|working woman)− E (xiβ|man),
valuation of the unobserved characteristics, E (ui|working woman)−0, and discrimination (coeﬃcient on a female dummy).
Comparing 1979 to 1999, the observed gap changed from -0.95 to -0.63. In agreement with the MR’s findings, only a small
part of the closing is explained by the change in the observed characteristics (from -0.024 to 0.0007), and the composition
of females in the workforce evolves mostly due to changes in the unobserved characteristics (from 0.007 to 0.098), although
the latter change is not from a negative to positive selection bias as found by MR, but rather from a nearly zero to positive
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use these distribution parameters to repeat experiments 1-4 in the calibrated framework from Section IV;
however, because of the diﬀerent selection rules implied by that calibration and by the Heckman model,
several important moments implied by the model, when the normal counterpart of (m1999,S1999) is used
in place of the model’s (µ,Σ) , will be diﬀerent from the corresponding 1999 empirical moments. We
thus recalibrate the model, i.e., search for the parameters that make the selection rule predicted by the
model more consistent with that predicted by the Heckman model. We set the parameters of the earnings
distribution to their empirical counterparts given by the Heckman model, normalize q = 1, and choose
the remaining parameters θ, ρ, λ, µ, v (starting with the initial guess from the calibrated values from Sec-
tion IV) to match P (2E) , E(X |2E), and E(Y |2E). There is no overidentification problem, because the
match is imperfect. This gives θ = 0.215, ρ = 0.181, λ = 0.49, µ = 0.36, v = 0.35. We find that changes
in the mean vector alone account for 40% of the increase in the proportion of dual earner couples, and
in a manner consistent with the cross-sectional participation38 and leisure patterns. Again, most of the
aggregate and group-specific increases in participation are driven by the closing of the gender gap, while
the increase in purchasing power is the dominant force behind the leisure patterns. We find that the drop
in the price of home appliances accounts for even less (3.8%) of the increase in participation.
Sensitivity with respect to λ, µ, v
Rather than setting λ, µ, v to particular values, we check for the robustness of our results with respect
to the following 9 sets of calibrations. In the first three, we vary the value of λ among {0.3, 0.5, 0.7} , while
allowing for the remaining parameters (except ρ and θ, which are set to their values from Table 4 ) to vary
to match the moments from Table 3. The second set of three calibrations is similar, except that we now
vary the value of µ among {0.2, 0.4, 0.5} , while allowing λ to change. In the last set, we vary the value of v
among {0.2, 0.4, 0.5}. Because the moments of interest remain the same across these calibrations, the 1999
decision rule threshold varies little, which makes it unnecessary to reestimate the earnings distribution
parameters with each recalibration. Overall, these calibrations assign a somewhat smaller role to changes
in the entire distribution (accounting for 70-73% of the observed rise in participation). The change in the
mean vector is still the main driving force, accounting for 51-56% of the rise in participation. The role
of home appliances is again much smaller, accounting for 2-5% of the rise in participation. Implications
for cross-sectional and leisure trends are similar to what was found in the main body of the paper.
VIII. Comparison to Jones et al. (2003) and Greenwood et al. (2005)
How do we reconcile the diﬀerence in the results found in Greenwood et al. (2005) and Jones et al.
(2003), both closely related to our work? Before answering this question, we note that as we find all
aspects of the earnings distribution other than the closing of the gender gap quantitatively less important
bias. Finally, in contrast to MR’s findings, a large part of the closing of the gender gap is driven by declining discrimination
(coeﬃcient on a female dummy rises from -0.93 to -0.73). Recall that, in contrast to MR, we regard a person as a worker
if he/she works a positive number of annual hours, and we work with the Census data on married couples with working
husbands. Although outside the scope of this paper, further inquiry is desired to pinpoint the reasons behind the discrepancy
between our results. We did find, however, that excluding the log of the husband’s earnings from the selection equation (as
is done in MR) generates results that are closer to MR, in particular, the reversal of the selection bias from negative in 1979
to positive in 1999.
38 In comparison to Table 7, Experiment 2 here implies increase in female participation ranging from 117% in the lowest
interval to 95% in the highest interval.
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for female LFP, our results reinforce the importance of focusing on the factors investigated by Greenwood
et al. (2005) and Jones et al. (2003).
Our results regarding the relative importance of the closing of the gender gap and the decline in prices
of home appliances are more in line with those of Jones et al. (2003). We estimate changes in the earnings
distribution from the census data, using our model to correct for the selection bias, and then examine
the quantitative response of households to the estimated change. By contrast, Jones et al. (2003) ask
whether a small exogenous change in the relative female-to-male wages (due to anti-discriminatory law)
through its direct eﬀect and its indirect eﬀect on human capital accumulation, can generate trends in
participation and the observed gender wage gap in a manner consistent with their empirical counterparts.
In fact, because we focus on households’ response to the closing of the gender gap (direct eﬀect) without
inquiring into the reasons underlying this change, and because we find that the response is quantitatively
important, our work suggests that in order to further understand the rise in female LFP, it is important
to disentangle the relative contributions of factors to the closing of the gender earnings gap (including
human capital accumulation, changes in antidiscriminatory laws, etc., as discussed in Section I). Jones et
al. (2003) is a step in this direction.
While we focus on 1959-1999, Greenwood et al. (2005) investigate 1900-1990.39 It is diﬃcult to
interpret the results of their counterfactual experiments for the period 1960-1990 in isolation, because
their baseline model, which incorporates both the closing of the gender gap and the decline in prices
of home appliances, actually generates a fall in female participation for this period.40 Still we attempt
to provide some insight into why our findings regarding the relative importance of the fall in prices of
home appliances and the narrowing of the gender gap are diﬀerent. Our basic message here is that the
discrepancy is not due to diﬀerences in the modeling choice but rather due to diﬀerences in the time
series representing exogenous changes.
Importantly, when performing the experiment of the closing of the gender wage gap, Greenwood et al.
(2005) purposefully shut down the eﬀect of the increasing purchasing power associated with the catching
up of female wages, thus slightly decreasing the importance of the closing of the gender gap. A more
important factor driving the descrepancy, however, is that the gender gap time series used in the analysis
of Greenwood et al. (2003) is taken from Goldin (1990). This time series reflects the relative observed
earnings of full time full year workers. Correcting for the selection bias, as we show, results in a greater
closing of the gender gap and hence a greater impact on participation, at least for the time period that
we study.
Furthermore, the prices of home appliances experienced a much more dramatic fall in the first half
of the 20th century, as opposed to the period considered in this paper and in Jones et al. (2003). For
this reason, it is indeed likely that the decline in prices of home appliances was a more important force
behind changes in female LFP in the first half of the 20th century. However, the 8.3% annual fall, used
in Greenwood et al. (2003), still seems to overstate the relevant fall. First, the quality adjustment
is made only for home appliances, although other consumption goods also experienced large quality
improvements. Second, the price index time series is based on appliances that include TVs and VCRs,
39As stated above, we cannot extend our analysis to an earlier period, because the U.S. census provides income information
for both spouses (not just the main respondent) beginning with the 1960 census.
40This fall is an artifact of transitional dynamics.
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which would appear to complement leisure time, not substitute for time spent on home production. In
fact, Vandenbroucke (2006) hypothesizes that the fall in prices of leisure goods (such as TVs and VCRs)
should reduce market labor supply.
Are models in Jones et al. (2003) and Greenwood et al. (2005) suitable for evaluating implications
of diﬀerent factors against group-specific leisure trends and married female participation across groups
diﬀerentiated by the husband’s income? The answer is no. Jones et al. (2003) uses a representative
agent model. Greenwood et al. (2005) assumes perfectly assortative matching (i.e., spouses have identical
earning ability). In addition, it is assumed that the return to husbands’ time allocated to home production
is zero. Our results show that both the low correlation of spousal earnings ability and husbands’ ability
to contribute to home production are crucial for generating disaggregated participation and leisure trends
consistent with the data.
IX. Conclusions
In this paper, we have quantitatively investigated the roles played by falling prices of home appliances
and changes in diﬀerent aspects of the earnings distribution in driving the dramatic increase in the fraction
of two-earner couples observed in the data since 1959.
We built a model of heterogeneous households, capable of shedding light on the question of how diﬀer-
ent aspects of the earnings distribution (gender earnings gap, purchasing power, within-gender inequality,
assortativeness of matching) may aﬀect aggregate time allocation patterns. The rich heterogeneity of the
model and its clear predictions regarding individual and aggregate leisure allow us to subject the factors
under consideration to a number of empirical tests, previously unexplored in this context.
The main finding is that the closing of the gender earnings gap is the main force underlying the rise in
the fraction of two-earner couples, accounting for over 70% of the observed rise. In close agreement with
the data, we find that the closing of the gender earnings gap also induces a higher response from females
with husbands in the upper range of the earnings distribution. Other aspects of the earnings distribution
yield quantitatively small changes in female participation, although an increasing correlation appears to
partly account for the greater rise in participation experienced by women with husbands at the top of
the earnings distribution.
We also find that the rise in purchasing power associated with "the catching up" of female earnings
generates a widespread diﬀusion of home appliances. This contrasts with the common belief that the
home production revolution is a result of falling prices of home appliances alone. Through such an eﬀect
on home appliances, the narrowing of the gender gap also accounts for the rise in leisure of working and
stay-home women, and the fall in the leisure of women on average, due to the change in the composition
of working and stay-home females in the married population. It also accounts for the fall in the relative
male-to-female leisure among 1M couples.
Finally, we find that the three-fold decline in the relative price of home appliances accounts for only
5% of the rise in female LFP, while implying counterfactually strong increases in average leisure trends.
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Appendix
Relationship between the moments of the log-normal and the underlying normal distributions
The relationship between the moments of the log-normal distribution,m =
"
m1
m2
#
and S =
"
s21 s12
s12 s22
#
,
and the underlying normal distribution, µ =
"
µX
µY
#
and Σ =
"
σ2X σXY
σXY σ2Y
#
, is given by
µX = log
Ã
m21p
m21 + s
2
1
!
, µ2 = log
Ã
m22p
m22 + s
2
2
!
,(10)
σ2X = log
µ
1 +
s21
m21
¶
, σ2Y = log
µ
1 +
s22
m22
¶
, σXY = log
µ
1 +
s12
m1m2
¶
.(11)
U.S. Census Data
See Bar and Leukhina (2007) for a more detailed record of the data analysis. We work with the U.S.
Census data available through IPUMs (2004). Although the census was conducted in 1960, 1970, ...,
2000, income and worktime questions refer to the previous year. Hence, the observations used in this
paper are for 1959, 1969, ..., 1999. We match spouses using the household serial number and create a
household-level dataset. Only non-farm married couples with each spouse between the ages of 25 and
64 are considered. We refer to an individual as an earner if he/she works a positive number of hours.
No-earner couples and couples with a female as the only earner (around 6% of the original sample) are
excluded.
We correct for the topcoding of all income types in 1959, 1969, 1979 only, because the topcoded
observations in 1989 and 1999 are already replaced by the state mean or median. We infer labor income
as the sum of wage and business incomes and convert all income observations into 1999 dollars using
the 12 months averages of the seasonally adjusted consumer price index for the five census years: 29.17,
36.68, 72.58, 123.94, 166.58.
Worktime variables titled "actual weeks worked last year" and "usual weekly hours worked (last
year)" are available since the 1980 census only. The 1960 and 1970 censuses, however, report information
regarding the interval of weeks worked and the interval of weekly hours worked in the previous year. We
must choose the appropriate midpoints for each of the intervals. To do so, using the information provided
in the 1980 census on actual and intervalled hours and weeks, we compute gender-specific averages for
each interval.
Table 8 reports a few descriptive moments of the married population sample that we work with.
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Table 8. Selected Descriptive Moments
1959 1969 1979 1989 1999
Fraction of two-earner couples 0.3297 0.4424 0.6145 0.7429 0.7621
E(weekly hours | 2E, male) 42.726 42.653 43.252 44.42 45.026
E(weeks | 2E, male) 48.73 49.954 48.699 48.525 48.925
E(annual hours | 2E, male) 2088.4 2134.9 2118 2169.4 2217.3
E(weekly hours | 1M, male) 43.209 43.072 43.639 44.722 45.609
E(weeks | 1M, male) 49.313 50.172 48.662 47.812 48.174
E(annual hours | 1M, male) 2136.9 2165.1 2135.8 2157.7 2215.4
E(weekly hours | male) 43.049 42.886 43.401 44.497 45.165
E(weeks | male) 49.121 50.076 48.685 48.341 48.746
E(annual hours | male) 2121 2151.8 2124.8 2166.4 2216.9
E(weekly hours | 2E, female) 33.967 33.465 34.388 35.939 36.967
E(weeks | 2E, female) 41.562 43.12 41.05 43.333 45.101
E(annual hours | 2E, female) 1449.2 1475.9 1459.8 1600.8 1708.1
E(labor earnings | 2E, male) 30304 41691 44044 45910 50097
E(labor earnings | 1M, male) 39864 52282 52702 54344 61827
E(labor earnings | male) 36712 47597 47382 48078 52888
E(labor earnings | 2E, female) 14577 18756 18213 22221 27303
CV(labor earnings | 2E, male) 0.6118 0.6212 0.7073 0.7979 0.9724
CV(labor earnings | 1M, male) 0.8042 0.7803 0.8179 0.9292 1.132
CV(labor earnings | male) 0.7812 0.7435 0.7698 0.849 1.0354
CV(labor earnings | 2E, female) 0.7229 0.7379 0.8414 0.8934 1.0295
E(labor earnings | 2E, female) / E(labor earnings | male) 0.3971 0.3941 0.3844 0.4622 0.5162
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) Suppose ν = 0. Then no home production takes place, k = l2f = l
2
m = 0. The decision
threshold can be derived analytically as
V1M (wm, L (wm)) = V2E (wm, L (wm)) ,
µ log (wm) = µ log (wm + L (wm)) + (1− µ) (1− λ) log
¡
1− l¯1f
¢
,
L (wm) = wm (A− 1) ,
where A = exp
µ
−(1−µ)(1−λ) log(1−l¯1f)
µ
¶
.
(ii) Suppose F (k, l) = kθl1−θ. Consider the maximization problem of a 2E household, given in (2) .
The objective function becomes
µ log (wm +wf − qk) + ν
£
θ log k + (1− θ) log
¡
l2m + l
2
f
¢¤
+(1− µ− ν)
£
λ log
¡
1− l¯1m − l2m
¢
+ (1− λ) log
¡
1− l¯1f − l2f
¢¤
+ κ.
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Because the marginal utility from k approaches infinity as k approaches zero, the optimal k is interior.
It can be obtained by solving the first-order condition,
µq
wm +wf − qk
=
νθ
k
,
which yields k = νθµ+νθ
³
wm+wf
q
´
. Finally, because the optimal time inputs into home production are
independent of wm and wf , the maximum value function associated with being a 2E household is of the
form
V2E (wm, wf) = µ log
µ
wm + wf −
νθ (wm +wf)
µ+ νθ
¶
+ νθ log
µ
νθ
µ+ νθ
µ
wm +wf
q
¶¶
+ κ2E , i.e.,
V2E (wm, wf ) = (µ+ νθ) log (wm + wf ) + κ˜2E ,(12)
where κ2E and κ˜2E are constants.
Similarly, the maximum value function associated with being a 1M household becomes
(13) V1M (wm, wf ) = (µ+ νθ) log (wm) + κ˜1M .
Using the derivations in (12) and (13) , we obtain the decision rule threshold L (wm) ,
V1M (wm, L (wm)) = V2E (wm, L (wm)) ,
(µ+ νθ) log (wm) + κ˜1M = (µ+ νθ) log (wm + L (wm)) + κ˜2M ,
L (wm) = wm (B − 1) ,
where B = κ˜1M−κ˜2Mµ+νθ .
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In this version of the model, F (k, l) = [θ (Ak)ρ + (1− θ) lρ]1/ρ .We want to show that an increase
in A is equivalent to a proportional decrease in q. Define the new variable k˜ ≡ qk and rewrite the problem
of the two-earner household as follows:
V2E (wm, wf) = max
c1m,c2m,c
1
f ,c
2
f ,k˜,l
2
m,l
2
f
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£
µ log
¡
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¢
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¡
1− l¯1m − l2m
¢¤
+(1− λ)
£
µ log
¡
c1f
¢
+ ν log
¡
c2f
¢
+ (1− µ− ν) log
¡
1− l¯1f − l2f
¢¤
s.t. c1m + c
1
f + k˜ = wm + wf ,
c2m + c
2
f ≤
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θ
Ã
A
k˜
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!ρ
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¡
l2m + l
2
f
¢ρ#1/ρ
,
0 ≤ l2j ≤ 1− l¯1j , j ∈ {m,f} .
It is clear that A and q appear in this problem as a ratio. Hence, increasing A by a factor of ζ is equivalent
to decreasing q by the same factor. The same proof applies to V1M (wm, wf ).
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Estimating {mt,St}t=1959, 1969,... for Conducting Several Counterfactual Experiments
We need to estimate the parameters of the potential earnings distribution to be used for conducting
several of the experiments. We use a censored regression model consisting of a Mincer earnings equation
and the participation rule implied by the calibrated model and the appropriate price of home appliances
(see the main text).
It is instructive to derive the log-likelihood function. The contribution to the log-likelihood function
made by observations with yi = 0 is given by
Pr (yi = 0) = Pr (xiβ + ui ≤ p (zi,Ω))
= Pr
µ
ui
σ
≤ p (zi,Ω)− xiβ
σ
¶
= Φ
µ
p (zi,Ω)− xiβ
σ
¶
,
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Conditional on yi > 0, the density of yi is f (yi|yi > 0) = f (yi) /Pr (yi > 0) = (1/σ)φ ((y∗i − xiβ) /σ) /
Pr (yi > 0) . Thus, we obtain the log-likelihood function,
logL =
X
yi>0
log
µ
1
σ
φ
µ
y∗i − xiβ
σ
¶¶
+
X
yi=0
log
µ
Φ
µ
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2
∙
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¸
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µ
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µ
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¶¶
.
The independent variable in the Mincer equation is the natural log of female annual earnings. The
dependent variables are the number of years of schooling, her experience, her experience squared, a
dummy variable for the white race and a dummy variable for the black race. Next, we explain how "years
of schooling" and the race dummies are constructed.
The U.S. Census distinguishes between 9 education codes. With each code, we associate a certain
number of years of schooling. Our assumptions are summarized in the table below.
Table 9. Educational Record
Education code (defined in the U.S. census) Years of schooling
None or preschool 1 0
Grade 1, 2, 3, or 4 2 3
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 3 7
Grade 9 4 9
Grade 10 5 10
Grade 11 6 11
Grade 12 7 12
1 to 3 years of college 8 14
4+ years of college 9 18
The U.S. census defines 9 diﬀerent race codes: (1) White, (2) Black, (3) American Indian, (4) Chinese,
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(5) Japanese, (6) Other Asian or Pacific Islander, (7) Other race, n.e.c., (8) Two major races, (9) Three
or more major races. We define a dummy variable "black_id" to equal 1 whenever code 2 is observed,
and a dummy variable "white_id" equal 1 whenever codes 1, 4, 5, 6 are observed.
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Figure 5
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